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Abstract
When a company goes public, it is standard practice that the underwriting syndicate allocates more
shares than are issued. The underwriter thus holds a short position that it commonly fills by aftermarket
trading when market prices fall or, when prices rise, by executing the so-called overallotment option.
This option is a standard feature of initial public offering (IPO) arrangements that allows the underwriter
to purchase more shares from the issuer at the original offer price. We propose a theoretical model to
study the implications of this combination of short position and overallotment option on the pricing of
the IPO. Maximizing the sum of both the profits from their share of the offer revenue and the potential
profits from aftermarket trading, we show that underwriters strategically distort the offer price. This
results either in exacerbated underpricing when favorably informed underwriters lower prices to secure
a signaling benefit, or in informationally inefficient offer prices when underwriters pool in offer prices
irrespective of their information.
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the sum of both the profits from its share of the offer revenue and the poten-
tial profits from aftermarket trading, we show that underwriters strategically
distort the offer price. This results either in exacerbated underpricing when
favorably informed underwriters lower prices to secure a signaling benefit, or
in informationally inefficient offer prices when underwriters pool in offer prices
irrespective of their information.
JEL Classification: G14, G24, G28.
Keywords: Initial Public Offering, Aftermarket Trading, Informational Effi-
ciency, Underpricing.
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I. Introduction
Price stabilization in the aftermarket of initial public offerings (IPOs) has been legal
practice in the U.S. since the Securities Act of 1934 and is typically performed by the
underwriter that organizes the IPO on behalf of the newly-issued company.1 The official
purpose of stabilization as stated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is as
follows: “Although stabilization is a price-influencing activity intended to induce others
to purchase the offered security, when appropriately regulated, it is an effective mech-
anism for fostering the orderly distribution of securities and promotes the interests of
shareholders, underwriters, and issuers.”2 While the regulator-backed aftermarket trad-
ing activities by underwriters are intended to stabilize the post-offer market price, their
existence can also have undesired effects on IPO pricing. These adverse effects are the
focus of this paper.
Current regulations allow underwriting investment banks (henceforth “banks’) to pur-
sue the following three types of aftermarket activity. First, visibly labeled stabilizing bids
(though rarely observed) can be posted at or below the offer price during the distribution
period of the securities. Second, penalty bids can be used to penalize customers who im-
mediately resell (‘flip’) their securities in the aftermarket.3 The key feature that we focus
on here is the third activity, by which banks establish a short position —the “overallot-
ment facility’— by selling securities in excess of the pre-announced amount at the offering.
Aftermarket short covering refers to the practice of filling this position in the aftermarket.
Alternatively, the bank can fill the short position by exercising the overallotment option,
the “Greenshoe” — a call option that underwriters hold to obtain typically an additional
15 percent of the originally issued amount of securities from the issuer at the offer price.4
The important observation for this paper is that by combining the overallotment facil-
1It is also legal in the E.U. based on Commission Regulation (EC) 2273/2003, which closely resembles
the SEC regulations.
2Regulation M, Release No. 34-38067, p. 81, SEC (1997).
3See Fishe (2002) for a detailed account of penalty bid mechanisms for flippers.
4See http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/ci111400ex regs-k sss.htm for a synopsis of the
SEC rules on “syndicate short sales.’
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ity with the overallotment option, the bank can earn a risk-free profit: If the market price
exceeds the offer price, covering the short position in the market would be expensive, but
this loss can be avoided by drawing the overallotment option (the bank will earn extra
proceeds). In fact, in the bulk of offerings, the initial short position is perfectly hedged
by this option so that increasing prices are not a risk for the bank. If the price drops,
the bank provides liquidity through open market purchases. In doing so, it does not ac-
cumulate inventory but covers its short positions at a price below the offer price. The
difference between the market price and the offer price (minus the gross spread) is the
aforementioned risk-free profit. Indeed, case studies in Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001)
and Boehmer and Fishe (2004) document that banks can earn substantial short covering
profits.5
The purpose of this paper is to develop a model of the going public procedure in which
we can study the impact of short covering profits on the choice of the offer price. We
model a situation in which both the bank and investors hold private information (beyond
mandatory disclosure requirements) about the intrinsic value of the offered security. The
offering procedure is then a signaling game in which the bank moves first and sets the
offer price. It chooses the offer price strategically to maximize its profits from both the
gross spread of the offer revenue and trading profits in the aftermarket. Investors fully
understand this process, and the bank anticipates the investors’ best replies, i.e. their order
decisions given the chosen offer price. Thus investors account for any potential losses that
they may incur if the IPO trades below the offer price; in other words, potential losses
are priced into the offer price.6
5See also Aggarwal (2000) and Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000) for cross-sectional analyses. For a
further elaboration see Fishe (2002), Section IV D. More recently, Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu (2007)
provide additional evidence for underwriter aftermarket trading activities in Nasdaq IPOs. They show
that lead underwriters’ clients are net buyers in the aftermarket and that quid pro quo arrangements
allow bookrunners to substitute client purchases for direct aftermarket support. A recent paper by SEC
staff, Edwards and Hanley (2007), indicates that there is a substantial number of “failures to deliver”
connected to short-sales. The authors of this study indicate that these failures to deliver are connected to
the short-selling activities of the underwriter. While this is not hard evidence for strategic short covering,
it indicates that underwriters delay their short covering, possibly waiting for even lower prices.
6There is a substantial number of IPOs that trade below their offer price: An example is the May 24,
2006 IPO of Vonage which fell from its initial offer price of $17 to $14.85 on the first day of trading.
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We first establish an informationally efficient benchmark in a setting without after-
market activities. In this context, a separating equilibrium is informationally efficient
since the bank’s information is fully revealed by the offer price; a pooling equilibrium is
informationally inefficient as the bank’s signal is concealed. Higher prices are preferred
by all types of banks (and also by the company whose shares are being issued), but the
banks wish to avoid incurring the reputation costs involved if the offer fails due to in-
sufficient demand. The resulting single crossing property generates an informationally
efficient equilibrium, unless the reputation costs are too low.
Introducing aftermarket short covering into the model leads to one of two outcomes:
Either the offer price falls on average, or the separating equilibrium breaks down and a
informationally inefficient pooling equilibrium prevails.
The exacerbated underpricing result may appear surprising because the higher the
price, the larger both the offer revenue and the possible price-drop. And larger price
drops cause higher potential profits from short covering. This simple view would call for
less underpricing. Yet signalling behavior is more subtle. In our model, banks can either
choose a price that is risk-free; at such a (low) price all investors order, irrespective of their
signal. Or they can choose a risky price; at this (high) price only high-signal investors
order. As there may not be sufficiently many of them, demand may be so low that the
order must be rescinded.
In a separating equilibrium, a low-signal bank would choose a risk-free low price and a
high-signal bank chooses a risky high price. This latter price is low enough so that it is not
profitable for the low-signal bank to deviate and assume the risk of failure. Now suppose
there is potentially an extra benefit from short covering. The key insight is that a low-
signal bank considers a price drop in the aftermarket more likely (as it has less favorable
information), and thus for a given price, potential profits from short covering are higher
for the low-signal than for the high-signal bank. The high-signal bank, therefore, has to
distort prices downwards to maintain separation. A pooling equilibrium arises when it
does not pay for the high-signal bank to maintain separation.
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A comparative statics analysis reveals that an increase in the gross spread or an
increase of the size of the short position that is covered by the overallotment option
reduces the parameter set associated with informational efficient prices, and underpricing
is exacerbated for the informationally efficient prices. Thus empirically, markets in which
overallotment options or spreads are larger should tend to exhibit more withdrawn IPOs
and higher market uncertainty due to lower information efficiency. Further, for markets
that have underpricing on average but different levels of the spread or different sizes
of the overallotment option, we predict that the market with larger spreads or larger
overallotment options has more underpricing (controlling for all other parameters).
Turning to wealth effects, when combining the profits of a low- and a high-signal bank,
it turns out that the price distortions lead to a redistribution of wealth in favor of the
banks for most parameter configurations (Section V.). Banks would thus prefer that the
aftermarket price stabilization tools combined with the overallotment option are included
in their contract. This is not immediately obvious as high-signal banks have to lower
the offer price and thus forego revenue. Yet even the high-signal bank may profit from
aftermarket trading. The price distortions are not necessarily to the issuing company’s
detriment: While it loses if separation prevails because there is more underpricing, it is
better off in a pooling equilibrium.7
There are two related papers that also model the overallotment option:8 Zhang (2004)
models this option as a marketing tool that is employed to induce increased demand for
the offer. The existence of the option makes it easier to convince market participants to
invest in information acquisition and this should thus reduce underpricing. Aftermarket
price uncertainty is exogenous in his model and, as in Benveniste and Spindt (1989), the
offer cannot be overpriced. Zhang’s results thus nicely complement ours as they highlight
the positive features of the overallotment option when price drops are impossible.
7It is important to emphasize that everyone in our model is rational and understands the other players’
strategies; consequently no market participant is deceived or shortchanged.
8Two other theoretical papers with aftermarket stabilization are (Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm
(1996) and Chowdhry and Nanda (1996)). These assume that the stabilization techniques are costly for
the bank and thus serve as bonding mechanisms between investors and bank to prevent overpricing.
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Fishe (2002) also emphasizes the value of the overallotment option, and in addition
he shows that the presence of the option will reduce the offer price. This increased
underpricing occurs because the bank can raise the (virtual) value of the overallotment
option by lowering the strike (i.e. offer) price. The intuition behind his result and thus
its interpretation is different from ours: in his paper, the option avoids the costs of
covering the initial short position at increased market prices. In our strategic model,
underpricing increases because the flip-side —covering the short position in the market—
is valuable. Increased underpricing thus occurs in our model because a bank with favorable
information wants to signal that the price drop is unlikely to occur. Our contractual
arrangement between issuer and underwriter is similar to that in Fishe, who provides a
nice justification for optimality of this arrangement (Section III, C). The focus of our
study differs in that Fishe analyzes the impact of stock-flipping whereas we determine the
informational content of offer prices and the welfare effects for issuers, bank and investors.
Our paper fits more broadly into the recently emerging literature that studies the
relation of IPO bookbuilding and aftermarket trading. For instance, our framework shares
modeling analogies with Chen and Wilhelm (2007), who focus on the dynamic relation
between share allocations and pricing. They also assume that informational asymmetries
prevail after the bookbuilding process is completed. The issuer in their model would like to
price-discriminate against investors, by first selling to high-valuation types at a high price
(analogous to dynamic monopolistic pricing) and to low-valuation types later. While SEC
regulations preclude non-uniform pricing, Chen and Wilhelm show that the issuer can still
extract some of the possible price-discrimination rents by using the services of a financial
intermediary who has long-term, repeated interactions with institutional investors. The
intermediary would grant investors preferential allocations in future IPOs in return for
implicitly implementing the price-discriminatory scheme in the IPO aftermarket. Their
model thus sheds light on how IPO pricing and allocation interact when offer prices do
not reflect all information.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II., we introduce and dis-
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cuss our model of the offering procedure without aftermarket short covering. Section III.
outlines necessary and sufficient conditions for the informationally efficient equilibria. Af-
termarket short covering is introduced and its impact analyzed in Section IV., and the
description of the redistribution of profits follows in Section V.. Section VI. concludes.
The appendix contains all the proofs and describes the tools used in the equilibrium
analysis.
II. The Benchmark Model without Short Covering
Overview of a the Going-Public Process. A firm that intends to go public first
appoints an investment bank (that in turn assembles the sales syndicate). The initial
agreement between the firm and the bank specifies the gross spread (usually 7 percent)
and typically grants a 15 percent overallotment option to the bank. The bank starts the
due diligence process and the firm files the registration statement with the SEC. The bank
then circulates the preliminary prospectus (“Red Herring”) and organizes a road show in
which the firm and the bank meet with investors.
During the road show the firm and the bank promote the IPO based upon the informa-
tion contained in the prospectus. The prospectus also includes an initial indicative price
range. Importantly, at this stage, the “book” is built from bids of potential investors.
Since the firm and the bank usually do not provide information beyond the information
contained in the prospectus, the road show is primarily a vehicle for acquiring information
from potential investors.9 Once the registration statement has SEC approval, the effective
day can be set. Prior to the effective day, it is illegal to sell shares; so all offers submitted
by investors during the road show are classified as non-binding indications of interest.
After the road show, on the day prior to the issuance day, the firm and the bank agree
on the definitive offer price and the exact number of shares to be sold.10 The offer price
9The incentive problem of truthfully eliciting investors’ information was first discussed in Benveniste
and Spindt (1989) and Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990).
10If the firm and the bank cannot agree then the IPO is canceled; see Busaba (2006).
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can lie outside the indicative price range and indeed sometimes does. The final prospectus
(which contains the definitive offer price) is released at this point. The distribution of the
stocks begins on the morning of the issuance day. Potential investors are notified of the
final terms of the offering and are asked to confirm their indications of interest.
The going-public process in Europe can differ in various aspects. Most importantly,
while it is strictly prohibited in the U.S. for the bank or the firm to interact with potential
investors prior to registration with the SEC, this is routine in Europe. The bank derives
its signal about the likely overall market reaction to the IPO from this interaction. It then
sets the price range which thus incorporates the bank’s information. Typically European
IPOs are priced at the top end of the range (for a detailed account of the U.S.-European
differences see Jenkinson, Morrison, and Wilhelm (2006)) and rarely outside of it. When
applying our analysis to a European context, the offer-price should thus be understood
as the point in the price span that is conventionally chosen.11
The bank’s involvement may continue beyond the opening day of trading. First, the
bank must decide whether to sell shares in excess of the original amount offered. Next, if
the bank does oversell, then it must cover this short position eventually either by exercising
the overallotment option or by short covering in the aftermarket. In the course of these
aftermarket activities, the bank might also use stabilizing or penalty bids. The final stage
of an IPO begins with the end of the “quiet period” when the bank and other research
analysts are allowed to comment on the valuation of the new stock.
The Staging of the Model. Our model has the following simple structure: the bank
and the investors each receive a signal about the issuing firm, then the bank sets a price
and investors decide whether or not to buy. If sufficiently many investors buy, the issue is
listed; otherwise it is withdrawn. If listed, then (after-)market prices react and aggregate
11Jenkinson, Morrison, and Wilhelm (2006) report that, for instance, German IPOs 72% are priced
at the top end of the range. Taking these conventions as given, one should note that in many respects,
European IPO selling mechanisms are similar to fixed price offerings even though they are formally
bookbuilding mechanisms. Partly this may be due to the fact that until the mid-90s, European IPOs
were mostly sold in fixed price offerings, as reported in Jenkinson, Morrison, and Wilhelm (2006). Even
today many French and almost all UK IPOs (see Ellul and Pagano (2006)) are sold in fixed price offerings.
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all available information; any short-position that the bank may have established is covered
either in the market or through the overallotment option.12 This process is illustrated in
Figure 1. At the end of this section we will outline in detail how this model maps into
the above, standard going-public setting. The details of our model are as follows:
Figure 1 here.
The Security. The security on offer can take one of two equally likely values V ; for
simplicity V ∈ {0, 1}.
The Investors. There are N identical, risk neutral investors who can place unit
orders of the security. Each investor receives a costless, private, conditionally i.i.d. signal
si ∈ {0, 1} about the value of the security. This information is noisy, i.e. Pr(si = v|V =
v) = qi with qi ∈ (12 , 1). If he receives a share, the investor’s payoff is the market price
minus the offer price, otherwise his payoff is zero. An investor’s type is his signal, thus a
“high-signal investor” has si = 1, a “low-signal investor” has si = 0. Since the prior on
the liquidation values is uniform, the signal quality qi coincides with the signal recipient’s
posterior probability assessment that the value is V = 1.
The Issuer. We assume the issuer to be non-strategic. He holds no private informa-
tion about the value of the security and signs a standardized contract with an investment
bank which specifies the amount of securities S < N to be sold and delegates the pricing
decision. It also specifies the gross spread β of the offer revenue that remains as remuner-
ation at the bank; this way, the incentives of bank and issuer are aligned as both would
like a high revenue. The issuer’s payoff is thus fraction (1− β) of the offer revenue if the
offer is floated, otherwise it is zero.
The Bank. The risk neutral bank receives a private signal sb ∈ {0, 1} about the
value of the security.13 This signal is noisy and conditionally independent from investors’
signals and has quality qb, where Pr(sb = v|V = v) = qb. If sb = 1 we refer to the bank as
12We will first establish a benchmark case without the overallotment option and without aftermarket
activities and later extend the analysis to the full specification.
13As argued earlier one can also think about this as a signal about market demand. These two are
correlated, but analytically it is simpler to handle a signal about the fundamental.
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a “high-signal bank”, for sb = 0, it is a “low-signal bank”. The bank receives the signal
after the contract has been signed and then announces the offer price p. If the offer is
withdrawn, the bank’s reputation is damaged and it thus incurs cost C.14 Costs that the
offering procedure itself may cause are normalized to 0. Thus, if the offer is successful,
the bank’s payoff is βpS; if it is withdrawn, its payoff is −C.
The costs of a failing IPO are external to our formulation and can be thought of as
capturing the opportunity costs from lost market share when being associated with an
unsuccessful IPO. (Withdrawals are a common phenomenon, as described, for instance
in Busaba (2006) or Dunbar and Foerster (2008).) The bank’s signal can be understood
as its assessments of the overall market sentiment, and it is a disreputable indication of
the bank’s judgement to get it wrong. Indeed, there is evidence (Dunbar 2000) for losses
in market share subsequent to withdrawn IPOs. Moreover, companies such as Brendan
Wood International make a living of rating investment bank services based on issuers’
satisfaction reports.
So why does the market (as a collection of all investors) not punish overpricing? In our
framework the answer is simple: investors will receive sufficient compensation for the risk
of overpricing through the offer price because, as we show below, the offer is on average
underpriced — so these costs are implicitly built-in.
The Offer. A fixed number of S securities is offered at a fixed price p. If the demand
d is insufficient, d < S, the offer fails, is thus withdrawn, and the security does not get
listed. If d ≥ S, the offer is successful. If it is oversubscribed, the share-allocation is
pro-rated. After the distribution, demand d is revealed to the public, the security gets
listed and market trading starts at market price pm.
Two technical assumptions to simplify the analysis. We make two simpli-
fying assumptions that later allow us to find approximate closed form solutions for the
probability of a successful IPO and for offer prices. Define N¯(qi) := 64qi(1−qi)/(2qi−1)2.
14The model could be extended to allow the bank to buy up unsold securities. Costs then result from
expensively bought inventory positions and not from failure. C would thus be “smoothed”. This would
not alter our qualitative results but complicate the analysis considerably.
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Assumption 1 S = (1− qi)N.
Assumption 2 The number of investors N is larger than N¯(qi).
The first assumption simplifies computations. The results of the paper will continue to
hold qualitatively for any S < N/2, but the assumption allows us to derive approximate
closed form solutions for success-probabilities and prices. The second assumption simpli-
fies the analysis of the bank’s and the investors’ conditional distribution over favorable
signals. The use of both will become clear when we perform the equilibrium analysis.
Discussion of our model and its relation to the institutional conventions.
While our model abstracts from a number of institutional details of the going-public
process, it captures the relevant informational stages: We assume that after perusing the
initial prospectus, investors believe that a share of the firm has either a high or a low
value, each equally likely. The IPO process in our model begins with the distribution of
the preliminary prospectus, which includes the indicative price range.
The bank does not yet hold private information, so that the indicative range has no
signaling value.
At this point, the bank and the issuer embark on the road show. Since the road show
is primarily a tool to elicit potential investors’ valuations of the security on offer, it is the
bank (the “bookrunner”) that learns during this process. In our model, the information
that the bank acquires during the bookbuilding phase is summarized in its signal sb.
At the end of the bookbuilding process (i.e. after it received its signal) the bank sets
the final offer price. In our model, each investor holds private information at this point in
time; this is captured by the signals si. This information is meant to capture the portion
of investors’ private information that was not revealed during the road show.15 Faced with
the definitive price, each investor decides whether to uphold their indication of interest
and buy the security or whether to rescind their interest (we interpret N as the number
15Alternatively, as in Chen and Wilhelm (2007), there could be new information that arrives after
bookbuilding is complete.
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of investors that indicated their interest in the offering).16
Under European conventions, the informational stages are slightly different. Since
the bank solicits information from investors before the official book building starts, the
bank already has information about the likely market reaction when it sets the indicative
price-range. For this reason, when applying our model to the European context, the range
carries the informational content that only the definite offer price has under American
conventions. In Europe this price range is commonly perceived as binding, and usually
the definite offer price is set at the top end of this range. It is thus reasonable to model
this range as a single price (which, in equilibrium, will be the offer price that our model
yields). Investors then submit their orders based on this price (range) and their private
information. Thus when applied to the right informational stages that are outcomes of
the institutional conventions, our model is general enough to span both the European and
the North American setting.
III. Offer Prices without Short-Covering
Signaling Value of the Offer Price. An investor bases his decision on his private
information and on the information that the investment bank may reveal about its own
signal through the offer price. Denote by µ(p) the price-information and write µ(p) = 1
if the price reflects that the bank’s signal is sb = 1, µ(p) = 0 if the price reflects that
sb = 0, and µ(p) =
1
2
to indicate that the price is uninformative. We restrict the analysis
to pure strategies. These three are thus the only relevant cases in equilibrium.17
The Aftermarket Price. The market price is determined by the aggregate number
16Even though indications of interest are legally non-binding, it seems plausible that rescinding implies
costs; for instance the bank could exclude renegers from some or all its future offerings. To keep our
analysis parsimonious, we abstract from such costs in our model. In supplementary material that is
available on the authors’ websites, we present a further rigorous argument that explicitly allows such
costs and we show that they will not affect the equilibrium outcome. In a nutshell, rescinding costs can
be modeled as foregone future revenue. Thus while rescinding is costly now, it is also costly in the future,
implying that rescinding costs lower total payoffs. The supplementary material then shows that in such
a closed system rescinding costs will not affect the bank’s decision.
17In the literature there are various papers that employ signalling models in IPOs; for instance Leland
and Pyle (1977) use the number of shares issued.
11
of favorable investor signals. In our model this number is always revealed, either directly
through IPO demand or immediately after the float through trading activities. Thus write
pm(d) for the market price as a function of d ∈ {0, . . . , N}, the number of high-signal
investors. Appendix A fleshes out this argument and provides an extensive treatment of
price formation.
Investors’ Decisions and Expected Payoffs. We admit only symmetric, pure
strategies. Thus all investors with the same signal take identical decisions. These can
then be aggregated so that only three cases need to be considered, B := {B0,1, B1, B∅},
with B0,1 denoting that all investors buy, B1 denoting that only high-signal investors
subscribe, and B∅ meaning that no investor buys.
When deciding whether or not to order a share, an investor has to account for the
probability of actually obtaining a share. There are three cases to consider. First, when
all investors buy, market demand is N and the probability of receiving the security is
S/N . Second, suppose investor j orders and d − 1 other investors also order but overall
demand is weak, d < S. Then the IPO fails and the investors who ordered get shares with
probability 0. Third, suppose investor j and d− 1 other investors order and d ≥ S. Then
the probability that j assigns to receiving the security is S/d.
Investors order whenever their expected profit is non-negative. After observing the
offer price, an investor’s information set contains both his signal si and the information
inferred from the offer price, µ(p). Since signals are conditionally i.i.d., for every value V ,
there is a different distribution over the number of favorable signals (si = 1) among the
other N − 1 investors which we denote f(d− 1|V ). Investor j who receives signal si and
derives information µ(p) from the price assigns the following posterior distribution to the
event that there are d− 1 favorable signals among the other N − 1 investors
(1)
g(d−1|si, µ(p)) := Pr(V = si|si, µ(p))·f(d−1|V = si)+Pr(V 6= si|si, µ(p))·f(d−1|V 6= si).
Assume for now that all investors with the favorable signal (and only these) order the
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security, case B1. Then for a high-signal investor, at price p his rational-expectation payoff
from ordering has to be non-negative,
(2)
N∑
d=S
S
d
· (pm(d)− p) · g(d− 1|si = 1, µ(p)) ≥ 0.
Likewise for B0,1, when we need to ensure that investors with the low signal si = 0 want
to order. In (2) we then replace si = 1 with si = 0. Also, since all buy, the summation
runs from 1 to N , and S/d is substituted with S/N .
Threshold Prices. Denote by psi,µ the highest price that an investor is willing to
pay if all investors with signal s˜i ≥ si order (and only those), given signal si and price-
information µ. Thus p1,1 is the highest separating price when only high-signal investors
order (B1), p1, 1
2
the highest pooling price when only high-signal investors order (B1), p0, 1
2
the highest pooling price at which all investors buy (B0,1), and p0,0 the highest separating
price at which all investors buy (B0,1). At all these prices investors are aware that the
security price may drop in the aftermarket and that they may not get the security. The
threshold prices are formally derived in Appendix C.
The Investment Bank’s Expected Payoff. First consider case B1. Variable d
denotes the number of buys, i.e. the number of high-signal investors. If the true value is
V = 1, the cumulative probability of a successful IPO is given by
(3) Pr(d ≥ S|B1) =
N∑
d=S
(
N
d
)
qdi (1− qi)N−d,
analogously for V = 0. A bank with signal sb assigns probability αsb(S) to the event that
at least S investors have the favorable signal. Since the investment bank receives its signal
with quality qb, for sb = 1,
α1(S) = qb ·
N∑
d=S
(
N
d
)
qdi (1− qi)N−d + (1− qb) ·
N∑
d=S
(
N
d
)
(1− qi)dqN−di .(4)
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α0(S) is defined analogously. If the bank charges a price at which only high-signal investors
buy, its expected profit is
(5) Π(p|sb, B1) = αsb(S) · βpS− (1− αsb(S)) · C.
When all investors buy, the IPO never fails and bank-profits are thus Π(p|B0,1) = βpS.
Of course, if the price is set so high that no investor buys, a loss of C results with
certainty, Π(p|B∅) = −C.
Determining αsb with Assumptions 1&2. The two conditional distributions over
favorable signals generated by V = 0 and V = 1 are hump-shaped with peaks at N(1−qi)
and Nqi respectively. For large N , these two distributions become very concentrated
and do not overlap. Assumption 2 ensures this; see Figure 5 in Appendix C for an
illustration.18 Moreover, for N large, the two binomial distributions become symmetric
around their modes19 so that the probability of a failed IPO has a simple structure. Since
the IPO fails whenever d < S, we can use Assumption 1 to “cut” the distribution around
N(1 − qi) in half. Then the IPO fails with half the weight of the lower hump, so that
α0(S) = (2− qb)/2 and α1(S) = (1 + qb)/2. In what follows we will omit S from αsb .
A. Conditions for Informationally Efficient Prices
We now identify the conditions under which a profit maximizing investment bank will
reveal its information through the offer price. A separating equilibrium is defined as
informationally efficient since investors can derive the bank’s signal from the offer price.
In a pooling equilibrium information is shaded and thus it is informationally inefficient.
In this case, investors decide only on the basis of their private signals.
18The value N¯(qi) in Assumption 2 is derived from DeMoivre-Laplace’s Theorem.
19A binomial distribution is generally not exactly symmetric around its mode. However, if N is large
enough, by DeMoivre-LaPlace (0 < qi ± 2
√
qi(1− qi)/N < 1) we can employ the normal distribution,
thus treating the distribution as symmetric around its modes. The number of traders has to be large
enough so that for V = 0 there are almost never more than N/2 traders with a favorable signal, and vice
versa for V = 1. Indeed, the normality approximation applies for relatively small values of N , e.g. for
qi = .75, N¯ = 48.
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The Equilibrium Concept and Selection Criteria. The equilibrium concept for
this signalling game is the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). A common problem with
signalling PBEs is the multiplicity of equilibria, some being supported by “unreasonable”
out-of-equilibrium beliefs. The most intuitive equilibrium, however, should be the one
in which the least surplus is lost through costly signalling (sometimes referred to as the
“Riley”-outcome). To single out this outcome, we only consider equilibria that satisfy
Cho and Kreps’ (1987) Intuitive Criterion and, if this alone does not yield a unique
outcome, we select the equilibrium that is payoff dominant for the bank.
A pooling equilibrium is specified through (i) an equilibrium offer price p∗ from which
investors infer (ii) price-information µ = 1
2
, and (iii) investors’ best replies given their
private signals, µ, and p∗. A separating equilibrium is (i) a system of prices {p∗, p¯∗} and
price-information such that (ii) at p∗ = p¯∗, the high separation price, the price-information
is that the bank has the favorable signal, µ = 1, at p∗ = p∗, the low separation price,
the price-information is that the bank has the low signal, µ = 0, and (iii) investors’ best
replies given their private signals, µ, and p∗. In both separating and pooling equilibria, for
p 6∈ {p¯∗, p∗} out-of-equilibrium public beliefs are chosen “appropriately.” There are three
kinds of signaling equilibria in our setting: the already mentioned separating equilibrium,
a pooling equilibrium in which only high-signal investors buy, and a pooling equilibrium in
which all investors buy. The following result is a straightforward consequence of signaling,
the proof of which is in Appendix B.
Lemma 1 (The Highest Possible Low Separating Price)
There exists no separating offer price p∗ > p0,0.
In any separating equilibrium, therefore, the low price must be such that all investors
buy, and the highest such separating price, given price-information µ = 0, is p∗ = p0,0. In
what follows we refer to p0,0 as the low separation price.
In our context, the Riley-outcome would be so that the high-type bank chooses the
highest price low enough so that the low-signal bank cannot deviate from p0,0. More gen-
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erally, for any price p ∈ [p0,0, p0, 1
2
] in the range of potential risk-free prices (all investors
are willing to buy), define φsb(p) as the price at which the sb-signal bank would be indif-
ferent between charging a risky price φsb(p) at which only high-signal investors buy, B1,
and a safe pooling price p with B0,1 (all investors buy). Formally,
αsbβφsb(p)S− (1− αsb)C = βpS ⇔ φsb(p) =
p
αsb
+
1− αsb
αsb
C
βS
.(6)
In what follows we refer to φ1(p) as the high-signal bank’s deviation price, and to φ0(p) as
the low-signal bank’s deviation price. Since α1 > α0, the low-signal bank requires a higher
price as compensation for risk taking, φ0(p) > φ1(p) for all p ∈ [p0,0, p0, 1
2
]. In addition, the
higher the pooling price, the higher the lowest profitable deviation price, ∂φj(p)/∂p > 0,
j ∈ {0, 1}. We can now establish our first major result.
Proposition 1 (Conditions for Informationally Efficient Prices)
If (i) the high-signal bank’s deviation price from the highest safe pooling price is not
higher than the highest separating price, φ1(p0, 1
2
) ≤ p1,1, and if (ii) the low-signal bank’s
deviation price from the low separating price is not smaller than the highest risky pooling
price, φ0(p0,0) ≥ p1, 1
2
then there exists a unique PBE that satisfies the Intuitive Criterion
which is the following separating equilibrium
• the low-signal bank charges p∗ = p0,0 and all investors buy,
• the high-signal bank charges p¯∗ = min{p1,1, φ0(p0,0)} and only high-signal investors buy,
• if investors observe p 6= {p∗, p¯∗} then µ = 0 and all buy if p ≤ p0,0, only high-signal
investors buy if p0,0 < p ≤ p1,0, and no-one buys in all other cases.
The first condition, (i), φ1(p0, 1
2
) ≤ p1,1, together with the intuitive criterion is necessary
and sufficient to rule out pooling equilibria in which all investors buy, irrespective of their
signals. The second condition, (ii), φ0(p0,0) ≥ p1, 1
2
, ensures that there is no pooling where
only high-signal investors buy, B1. Within this range, the intuitive criterion itself ensures
that the bank with sb = 1 always charges the highest sustainable separating price. The
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high separation price p¯∗ is the minimum of p1,1 and φ0(p0,0). The bank cannot charge more
than p1,1, and it cannot credibly charge more than φ0(p0,0) as otherwise the low-signal
bank would deviate. Finally, since φ1(p0,0) < φ1(p0, 1
2
) ≤ p1,1, the high-signal bank is
willing to separate. The third bullet specifies the out-of-equilibrium beliefs and behavior
supporting the equilibrium. Details are in Appendix B.
Underpricing. In the context of this model underpricing occurs if the (first-day) market
price is above the offer price.
Proposition 2 (Underpricing)
In a separating equilibrium, on average, securities are underpriced.
Both types of investors only buy if their expected payoff is non-negative. At p0,0 the low-
signal investor breaks even in expectation but the high-signal investor expects a strictly
positive payoff. At p1,1 the high-signal investor just breaks even and the low-signal investor
abstains. Ex-ante, the expected payoff is positive, hence underpricing.
This result is a natural consequence of the Winner’s Curse-type reasoning that under-
lies the ordering decision of informed investors: offers may be overpriced and on average
they require compensation to be insured against the potential payoff loss from an over-
priced offering. Proposition 2 thus demonstrates that our model is in line with extant
IPO models such as Rock (1986).
B. An Intuitive Characterization of the Equilibrium
Deviation prices φsb are a convenient tool to describe restrictions. We will now reformulate
the conditions from Proposition 1 in terms of exogenous costs C. This allows us to
derive a simple linear characterization of the equilibrium. Consider first condition (i),
φ1(p0, 1
2
) ≤ p1,1. If C is so high that
φ1(p0, 1
2
) =
p0, 1
2
α1
+
1− α1
α1
C
βS
> p1,1(7)
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then, assuming the payoff-maximizing equilibrium for the bank, a separating equilibrium
cannot be sustained. Even a high-signal bank then prefers to sell the security at a price
where all investors buy. Consider now condition (ii), φ0(p0,0) ≥ p1, 1
2
. If C is so low that
φ0(p0,0) =
p0,0
α0
+
1− α0
α0
C
βS
< p1, 1
2
(8)
then a separating equilibrium, again, cannot be sustained (by payoff dominance). In this
case, even a low-signal bank is willing to choose a high, risky pooling price and the high-
signal bank can thus not credibly signal its information. If C is so high that φ0(p0,0) > p1,1
then for the low-signal bank it does not even pay to deviate to the highest separating
price, p1,1. This bound on C is given by
Cˆ :=
α0p1,1 − p0,0
1− α0 βS.(9)
Define, analogously, C¯ and C such that (7) and (8) hold with equality. We get C < Cˆ < C¯.
Figure 2 here.
Corollary 1 (Proposition 1 in Terms of Costs)
If C ∈ (C, C¯) then the unique equilibrium is the separating equilibrium from Proposition 1.
If C ∈ (C, Cˆ) then p¯∗ = φ0(p0,0), and if C ∈ [Cˆ, C¯) then p¯∗ = p1,1.
It has often been argued that certifying agents, here the investment bank, must have
“enough” reputation capital at stake to make certification credible. In this context, also
“too much” reputation can inhibit certification (separation from a low-signal bank) if it
becomes too expensive to jeopardize one’s reputation at a high, risky offer price. Figure 2
illustrates threshold costs and corresponding equilibrium prices.
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IV. The Impact of Aftermarket Short Covering
Overview of Short Covering and a Bank’s Strategy. Aftermarket short covering
works as follows: instead of issuing the principal volume of securities S the investment
bank over-allots O securities, i.e. it takes a short position of O shares.
Suppose first, that the market price falls below the offer price. Then the bank would
fill its short position in the market at this lower price. This practice is referred to as
aftermarket short covering. If the market price is below the offer price (minus the gross
spread), then the bank makes a trading profit.
Now suppose that the market price rises above the offer price. Covering in the market
would now be costly. However, most IPO contracts grant the bank a call option (the
so-called overallotment option) for a certain number of additional securities that the bank
can obtain at the offer price from the issuer. If the bank has this option and if its size
is also O, then it is perfectly hedged against rising prices and it may make a profit if
prices drop. We will now analyze how these potential aftermarket trading profits affect
the bank’s strategy.
For simplicity we assume that the bank issues either S + O or 0 securities, i.e. if
demand is below S+O then, as in the case without short covering, the offer is withdrawn.
Moreover, we also assume that the overallotment of shares coincides with the size of
the overallotment option.20 This merely simplifies the analysis and does not affect the
qualitative results.
We will now identify two scenarios that may result from introducing aftermarket short
covering. In the first, the high-signal bank sets a lower price (relative to the benchmark
without short-covering) to uphold separation from a low-signal bank. The second scenario
arises when upholding separation becomes too expensive, in which case the high-signal
bank starts to pool with the low-signal bank. The result is an informationally inefficient
20The SEC states on its website that “Most offerings have a short position at least equal to the
underwriters’ overallotment option” (http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/ci111400ex regs-
k sss.htm).
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outcome.
The intuition for our results is simple: With short covering large price-drops lead to
large short-covering profits. Price-drops occur with higher probability if the underlying
state is bad, and thus low-signal banks consider a price drop to be more likely. In the
benchmark separating equilibrium, a low-signal bank would not mimic a high-signal bank
because it fears costs from a potential IPO failure. With aftermarket trading gains,
however, some of the potential losses from a failed offering are offset by the prospect of
aftermarket trading profits.
Figure 3 offers an illustration of the transfers between issuer, bank, and investors.
Figure 3 here.
Notation Convention. In what follows we will denote functions, threshold values
and variables that pertain to the analysis with short covering by superscripts sc.
Payoffs with Short Covering. If the market price exceeds the offer price, pm(d) > p,
then the bank exercises the short position and keeps the gross spread βOp for these shares.
If the market price drops, pm(d) < p, then the bank covers its short position in the market,
earns trading profit p−pm(d), but does not obtain the spread on the O over-allotted shares.
We now write Π(p∗, B, sb) for the investment bank’s expected profits from the offer
revenue and we use Πsc(p∗, B, sb) for the trading profits. Suppose the offer price p is risky,
i.e. only high-signal investors order. Then
Πsc(p, B1, sb) =
N∑
d=S + O
O ·max {(1− β) · p− pm(d), 0} · Pr(d|sb).(10)
For a safe price (at which all investors buy) the summation runs from 0 to N . The bank
also accounts for the foregone gross spread β when buying back in the market.
Equilibrium Analysis. With short covering allowed, a high separation price, p¯∗ has
to be small enough so a low-signal bank cannot profitably deviate from the low, risk-free
price, p0,0. Thus the high-signal bank has to determine the low-bank’s deviation price
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φsc0 (p0,0) so that
Π(φsc0 (p0,0)|sb = 0, B1) + Πsc(φsc0 (p0,0)|sb = 0) = Π(p0,0|sb = 0, B0,1) + Πsc(p0,0|sb = 0).(11)
In what follows, we make two further assumptions.
Assumption 3 S+ O = (1− qi)N.
Assumption 4 qi and qb are sufficiently informative so that p1, 1
2
> 2p0,0.
Assumption 3 states that the overall amount of shares that can be issued remains constant
relative to the scenario without aftermarket short-covering. This normalization allows a
straightforward comparison of the payoffs in both scenarios. If we keep the number of
issued shares constant, then the offer revenue is only affected by changes in the price.
It also allows us to continue to use the closed-form price approximations. Assumption 4
requires that the signals of the investors and the bank jointly are sufficiently informative.
The assumptions allows us to avoid several case distinctions. Figure 4 in Section V. has
an illustration of the parametric configuration that corresponds to Assumption 4.
Lemma 2 (The Low-Signal Bank’s Deviation Price Drops)
For all prices p ∈ [p0,0, p0, 1
2
], the low-signal bank’s deviation price with short covering
φsc(p) is smaller than without short covering, φ0(p) ≥ φsc0 (p).
The low-signal bank considers it more likely than the high-signal bank that the price
drops, hence its potential gain from short covering is large, in particular, relative to
trading profits at the low separation price. This additional incentive for the low-signal
bank to mimic the high-signal banks forces the high-signal bank to reduce its offer price
further compared to the scenario without short-covering.
In what follows, if there is a switch from separating to pooling, we restrict attention
to those situations where the new equilibrium price is the risky pooling price p1, 1
2
.21 We
21Our results on informational efficiency are not affected by this restriction. To the contrary, taking
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can now establish the main result. Analogously to Corollary 1 we spell it out in terms of
the costs of withdrawal.
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium with Short Covering Relative to the Benchmark)
(a) There exists a lower bound Csc > C such that for all costs C ∈ [C,Csc), the only equi-
librium that satisfies the Intuitive Criterion and payoff dominance is a pooling equilibrium
at the highest risky pooling price p1, 1
2
.This price is informationally inefficient.
(b) There exists an upper bound C¯sc such that for all costs C ∈ [Csc, C¯sc] the unique
equilibrium that satisfies the Intuitive Criterion and payoff dominance is a separating
equilibrium. For the high separating price p¯∗ there exists a threshold Cˆsc ∈ [Cˆ, C¯sc) so that
(i) for costs C ∈ [Csc, Cˆsc) the high separation price is the low-signal bank’s deviation
price from the low separating price, p¯∗ = φsc0 (p0,0), p1, 1
2
< φsc0 (p0,0) < p1,1, and
(ii) for costs C ∈ [Cˆsc, C¯sc] the high separation price is the highest risky price p¯∗ = p1,1.
(c) On average, underpricing in the separating equilibrium is exacerbated.
The intuition for the result is as following: (a) When costs of withdrawal are low, then
without short-covering the high separation price is already close to the risky pooling price.
With short-covering profits, the bank would now have to lower the high separation price
below the risky pooling price to uphold separation. This is payoff dominated by pooling.
In (b)(ii), in contrast, costs are so high that the additional short-covering benefit is too
small to entice the low-signal bank into mimicking; neither the high nor the low separation
price is thus affected.
Part (b)(i) describes the middle region of costs where separation can be upheld, but
only by reducing the high separation price. Since separating prices weakly decrease,
underpricing increases (part c).
At first glance the result that average prices are lower is surprising because, after
all, the short-covering profits are expected to be larger when the offer price is higher.
pooling in a risk-free price into account would strengthen our findings. In addition, if there is a choice
between the high, risky pooling price, p
1, 1
2
, and the low, safe pooling price, p
0, 1
2
, the former will always
generate more ex-ante revenue.
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Agents should thus be even more inclined to set higher prices. But this casual intuition is
inaccurate because the driving force in equilibrium is not the low-signal bank’s aspiration
to exploit these profits but the high-signal bank’s defense against the low-signal bank’s
desires. This defense involves either lowering the risky price or surrendering to pooling
and thus making offer prices less informative.22
Comparative Statics. We can express the overallotment option O as a share r of
S, S + O = (1 + r)S. Thus, value r = 0 is the benchmark case without short covering.
Potential policy variables in our model are the bank’s share of the revenue, β, and the
size of the overallotment option, r.
Proposition 4 (Comparative Statics)
If the gross spread, β, or the size of the overallotment facility, r, increases, then Csc in-
creases so that the conditions for informational efficiency become more restrictive. More-
over, the difference Cˆsc − Csc increases so that average underpricing in the separating
equilibrium increases.
A higher level of β or r strengthens the bank’s incentive to set higher prices, so that the
high-signal bank has to lower its price to defend its high separation price. When the high
separation price is low, it gets too expensive to defend separation by lowering the price
so that pooling in p1, 1
2
results; this increases Csc. Close to Cˆsc, the smallest cost so that
the highest separation price p1,1 is employed, separation is upheld by employing a smaller
high separation price.
The result can be illustrated with Figure 2: an increase in β or r shifts the entire
22The argument here focusses on the relation of lower bound threshold costs C and Csc and “middle”
bound threshold costs Cˆ and Cˆsc. Since Cˆsc increases relative to Cˆ (by Lemma 2) and since also Csc
increases relative to C, then also C¯sc should increase relative to C¯. But this is not necessarily true — it
may actually decrease. Keeping N,β, and O fixed, C¯ and C¯sc are functions of the signal qualities qb and
qi. For low signal qualities, C¯
sc actually decreases. For such values the high separation price p1,1 and the
low, risk-free pooling price p
0, 1
2
are close. Expected aftermarket profits are higher for the risk-free price
and this outweighs the lower expected pooling revenue. This strengthens out result on informational
inefficiency. While C¯sc does increase relative to C¯ for high values of qb and qi, numerically these costs
are far off scale in the following sense: A natural upper bound for costs C is provided by the loss of all
(discounted) future business. This upper bound on C can actually be calculated and it turns out that for
all those combinations of qi and qb for which C¯
sc increases, the value C¯ far exceeds this “natural” upper
bound. Appendix D outlines the details of this argument.
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function to the right. Moreover, the slope of the increasing portion of the function becomes
smaller because Cˆsc increases by more than Csc. This implies an increase of the parameter
area for which there is separation in a price that is smaller than largest high separation
price, p1,1; this means that underpricing is more than proportionally exacerbated.
Empirically, if there is more pooling, then all banks will set a high price, thus risking
that they may have to withdraw the IPO. If there is average underpricing for a given cost
level, then underpricing is positively related to the size of the spread and the overallotment
option.
V. Payoff Analysis
Covering a short position in the market at a price below the offer price is unambiguously
profitable. Yet it is not immediately obvious that the possibility of short-covering is
profitable: compared to the setting without short covering, the high-signal bank has to
lower prices to “defend” itself against the low-signal banks. This lowers the offer revenue.
At the same time, the high-signal bank may also, in expectation, earn some short covering
profits. We now determine the net effect.
Payoff Comparison for the Investment Bank. As outlined at the beginning of
Section II., the bank obtains its signal after making the initial arrangements with the
issuer. So at that initial stage, would the bank prefer it if the possibility of short-covering
is included in the contract? To answer this question we sum the payoffs of the high- and
low-signal bank and compare the payoffs with and without short-covering.
In general this payoff depends on a all model variables, such as costs, signal qualities,
number of investors, spreads, and so on. To get a sense of the extend of the payoffs-shifts,
we look at the most extreme drop in revenue that may occur. This drop occurs if the
high-separation price drops to (almost) the high, risky pooling price. Then separation is
upheld with p¯sc = p1, 1
2
and psc = p0,0. This scenario thus also involves the lowest possible
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short covering profits.
We thus combine payoffs for high- and low-signal bank to compute the difference of
payoffs with and without short covering:
Π(p1, 1
2
|sb = 1, B1) + Πsc(p1, 1
2
|sb = 1, B1)− Π(p1,1|sb = 1, B1)
+Π(p0,0|sb = 0, B0,1) + Πsc(p0,0|sb = 0, B0,1)− Π(p0,0|sb = 0, B0,1).(12)
Figure 4 here.
Expanding this expression one can see that withdrawal costs cancel and that the sign
of the expression will not depend on N . Fixing spread and overallotment option to the
commonly observed value β = 7% and r = 15%, we illustrate in Figure 4 that for a
very large subset of parameter configurations qi and qb the bank gains. Moreover, the
set of parameters where banks lose is “visually” exaggerated because we measure only
the worst possible payoff outcome. It arises if parameters are such that Csc > Cˆ, which
does not necessarily occur. And even if Csc > Cˆ, then the bank loses only for a specific
subset of these costs C. The right panel in Figure 4 illustrates this point. Details of the
computations are in Appendix E.
Payoff Comparison for Issuer and Investors Given our model specification we can
only compare the revenue that the issuer receives in settings with and without short
covering.23 Suppose with short covering, separation is maintained. If the high separation
price decreases, p¯sc < p¯, then the issuer loses.
Yet if there is a switch from separation to pooling, then the issuer may actually gain.
The reason is that the expected price with separation is 1/2p0,0+1/2α1p1,1, whereas with
pooling it is 3/4p1, 1
2
. Using closed form expressions for prices that are outlined in the
appendix and some straightforward algebra one can see that payoffs with pooling are
23This is equivalent to expected profits: Profits here would be defined as the difference between revenue
per share and the true value, which, by the LLN, is identical to the aftermarket price.
25
larger.24 In other words, the issuer prefers the bank to play a pooling equilibrium.
Investors’ profits are directly opposed to the issuer’s profit. Whenever the issuer gains
(in expectation) investors lose and vice versa.
Even though this section is merely concerned with redistribution, it yields an inter-
esting insight. The investment bank is nearly always better off with aftermarket short
covering. The issuer never gains but often loses if separation is upheld, but wins if banks
switch from separation to pooling; the effect on investors’ payoffs is the opposite.
VI. Conclusion
It is common, legal practice that investment banks pursue price stabilizing activities in the
aftermarket of IPOs. We have proposed a theoretical model that highlights the strategic
impact of potentially profitable aftermarket trading on the offer price. Our analysis
shows that either the offer price is rendered informationally inefficient or, on average,
underpricing is exacerbated as compared to the benchmark case without aftermarket
price stabilization.
On a more general level, with efficient, frictionless markets there would be no need for
price stabilization. As it stands, however, price stabilization is allowed by the regulator,
suggesting that the IPO aftermarket is considered to be an imperfect market. When
operating and regulating in such an environment one must ensure that posited rules
do not create a whole new set of problems. Underwriter trading activities in the IPO
aftermarket are usually rationalized as a means to ensure “a more orderly distribution
of securities” and “a smaller aftermarket price volatility”. We do not contest that these
benefits exist. Before attaching payoffs to these “soft” factors, however, it is imperative to
first determine “hard” payoff shifts that can be directly attributed to aftermarket short
covering. To ensure that the possibility of aftermarket short covering does not reduce
informational efficiency or increase underpricing, the bank could be prohibited from filling
24There is a small region of parameters so that separation is still preferred because when short-covering
does take place, fewer shares are issued.
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short positions at prices below 1− β times the offer price.
Of course, in the current environment, short covering profits are possible and are thus
accounted for by the banks. Eliminating short-covering profits lowers banks’ total profits.
All else being equal, at the margin, this may cause banks to decline contracts so that some
companies cannot go public unless the gross spreads increases. Yet as Chen and Ritter
(2000) say, “investment bankers readily admit that the IPO business is very profitable,”
so it seems unlikely that banks’ participation constraints would be violated in most cases.
A Appendix: Aftermarket Price Formation
An efficient market price correctly aggregates the number of positive and negative sig-
nals about the value of the security. The offer demand is published after securities have
been issued. If only high-signal investors buy the offer, this demand reveals the total
number of good (and bad) signals. If all investors order the security, stated demand
is N , securities are allocated at random, but the demand is uninformative. Still, high-
signal investors expect the security to be worth more than low-signal investors and thus
high-signal investors without a share-allotment are willing to buy it from low-signal in-
vestors with a share allotment. Without modeling the price-finding procedure explicitly
we assume that an intermediate market process reveals the number of high signals d. For
instance, high-signal investors without a share-allotment submit unit market-buy-orders,
low-signal investors with a share-allotment submit unit market-sell-orders. All other in-
vestors abstain. Let d˜ be the number buyers and S˜ the number of sellers. Then the
number of high-signal investors is d˜ + S − S˜ and the market price pm will again depend
on the number of favorable signals d. The updated expectation of V thus becomes the
aftermarket price, pm(d) = E[V |d, µ] = Pr(V = 1|d, µ). Using Bayes’ rule, we can express
the aftermarket price as
pm(d|µ = 1) = Pr(d|V = 1)Pr(sb = 1|V = 1)
Pr(d|V = 1)Pr(sb = 1|V = 1) + Pr(d|V = 0)Pr(sb = 1|V = 0) .(13)
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The conditional prior distribution over signals has binomial structure, Pr(d|V = 1) =(
N
d
)
qdi (1−qi)N−d. Price-information µ about sb is unambiguous in a separating equilibrium.
We can therefore replace it with the conditional probability of the bank’s signal being
correct, qb or 1− qb. Then
(14) pm(d|µ = 1) = qbq
2d−N
i
qbq
2d−N
i + (1− qb)(1− qi)2d−N
.
B Appendix: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose p∗ > p0,0. At this price only high-signal investors buy. A high-signal bank will
always set a price where at least high-signal investors buy. Hence, high-signal investors
buy at both prices p∗ and p¯∗. A low-signal bank can now increase its payoff by setting a
higher price as α0 is not affected by this, a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 1
First we will argue that the only separating equilibrium surviving the Intuitive Criterion
(IC) is the one outlined in the proposition. Then we will argue that pooling cannot occur.
Step 1 (Separating) First observe that there cannot be a separating price p¯∗ where
investors choose B0,1 because otherwise the low-signal bank would deviate to this price.
Note that no separating price with p¯∗ > φ0(p0,0) can exist because at this price, the
low-signal bank would prefer to deviate. No price p¯∗ > p1,1 can exist since not even high-
signal investors would buy. Furthermore, p¯∗ ≥ φ1(p0,0) must be satisfied since otherwise
the high-signal bank would prefer to deviate to p0,0. Finally no price p¯
∗ below p1,0 is
reasonable because the high-signal bank would then deviate to this price. Take p˜, with
max{φ1(p0,0), p1,0} ≤ p˜ ≤ min{p1,1, φ0(p0,0)}. Note that such a p˜ always exists as long as
φ1(p0,0) ≤ p1,1 and p1,0 ≤ φ0(p0,0). The conditions stated in Proposition 1 ensure this is
the case because φ1(p0, 1
2
) > φ1(p0,0) and p1, 1
2
> p1,0.
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We analyze the candidate separating equilibrium
{(p∗ = p0,0, µ = 0, B0,1); (p¯∗ = p˜, µ = 1, B1);
(p∗ 6∈ {p∗, p¯∗}, µ = 0, B0,1 if p ≤ p0,0, B1 if p0,0 < p ≤ p1,0, B∅ else)}.
By definition of φ0(p0,0) it holds that
βp0,0S = α0βφ0(p0,0)S− (1− α0)C > α0βp˜S− (1− α0)C
so that the low-signal bank would not deviate to p˜. Since max{φ1(p0,0), p1,0} ≤ p˜, the
high-signal bank would also not deviate. Hence this is a PBE.
Now consider the application of the IC. Suppose a high separation price p¯ = ˜˜p with
p˜ < ˜˜p ≤ min{p1,1, φ0(p0,0)} is observed. This price is equilibrium dominated for a bank
with sb = 0 by definition of φ0(p0,0). The low-signal bank can therefore be excluded the
set of potential deviators. The only remaining agent is the high-signal bank. The best
response of high-signal investors then is to buy at p¯ = ˜˜p, i.e. B1. Hence the PBE with
p¯∗ = p˜ does not survive the IC. Applying this reasoning repeatedly, all separating prices
with p¯ < min{p1,1, φ0(p0,0)} can be eliminated.
Step 2a (Pooling with B0,1) For all investors to buy we must have p ≤ p0, 1
2
. Suppose
there was deviation to p = φ1(p0, 1
2
) < φ0(p0, 1
2
). For the low-signal bank this would not be
profitable by definition of φ0(p0, 1
2
). But for some beliefs about the signal of the bank and
corresponding best responses, high-signal investors could be better off. The best response
for investors with beliefs on the remaining set of types, i.e. µ = 1, however, is B1 as we
have φ1(p0, 1
2
) < p1,1. Hence, applying IC there cannot be a pooling equilibrium with B0,1.
Step 2b (Pooling with B1) We must have p ≤ p1, 1
2
. Since φ0(p0,0) > p1, 1
2
, the low-
signal bank would prefer to deviate to p0,0, hence this cannot be an equilibrium.
To summarize, restrictions φ1(p0, 1
2
) < p1,1 and φ0(p0,0) > p1, 1
2
ensure that the only
equilibrium surviving the IC is the one depicted in Proposition 1. 
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Proof of Proposition 2
In suffices to show the result for the highest possible separating offer prices as it will then
necessarily hold for lower separating prices. The market price will resemble the true value
of the security by the Law of Large Numbers applied to informative signals. Assumptions
1 and 2 imply that the IPO fails with probability 0.5 if the banks sets the high separation
price and the true value is V = 0. Likewise, if the true value is V = 1, then the IPO
never fails. The banks sets the high price when it receives the high signal, it sets the low
price when it sets the low-signal. If the true value is V = 1 then there is underpricing of
1−price. If the true value is V = 0, then there is underpricing of −price. Using the signal
probabilities, average underpricing is
Pr(V = 1)[qb(1− p1,1) + (1− qb)(1− p0,0)] + Pr(V = 0)[1− qb
2
· (−p1,1) + qb(−p0,0)]
=
1
2
[1− p0,0 − 1 + qb
2
p1,1] =
1
2
(1− qb − p0,0),
where the last step follows using the closed forms prices from Appendix C. Straightforward
algebra yields that 1− q − p0,0 > 0 for all qb, qi > 1/2. 
Proof of Lemma 2
Without short covering, all profits stem from the gross spread; with short covering, there
are also profits from short covering. Fixing all exogenous parameters, the offer revenue
stays constant when short covering is introduced because the amount of floated securities
is assumed to remain constant. It thus suffices to check if for a fixed price φ0(p0,0), short
covering profits for the low-signal bank are higher than for price p0,0. For if so, then the
high-signal bank has to lower the price to prevent a deviation by the low-signal bank.
The low-signal bank knows that the aftermarket price falls whenever demand is low.
Employing the closed form probabilities and prices that we derive in Appendix C, the
low-signal bank attaches probability qb/2 to the case that the IPO goes through at
risky price φ0(p0,0) and that prices then fall in the aftermarket. By the law of large
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numbers, short covering occurs always at price 0. Rising prices are no concern be-
cause of the overallotment option. The total expected short covering payoffs are thus
Πsc(φ0(p0,0)|B1, sb = 0) = (1− β)Oφ0(p0,0)qb/2. If the bank sets the low price, p0,0, then
the offer will always go through, and prices drop in the aftermarket with probability q.
Expected payoffs are thus Πsc(p0,0|B0,1, sb = 0) = (1− β)Op0,0qb. Thus
Πsc(φ0(p0,0)|B1, sb = 0)− Πsc(p0,0|B0,1, sb = 0) = (1− β)Oqb[φ0(p0,0)/2− p0,0].
Assumption 4 ensures that the above is positive because φ0(p0,0)/2−p0,0 > p1, 1
2
/2−p0,0 >
0. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Lemma 2 ensures that Csc ≥ C. The model is set-up so that all payoffs Π + Πsc can
be dealt with as one. The pooling outcome transpires analogously to Proposition 1; by
payoff dominance rules out separating equilibria in which both types of banks make lower
profits than in the pooling equilibrium. Value Cˆsc exists analogously to Proposition 1,
and Lemma 2 ensures that Cˆsc > Cˆ. By definition, for C > Cˆsc, the highest attainable
price is p1,1, and it is the only one selected by the Intuitive Criterion. 
Proof of Proposition 4
From Proposition 3 we know that a pooling equilibrium results for all C < Csc. Value
Csc is defined as the value of C for which equation (11) is fulfilled with φsc0 (p0,0) = p1, 1
2
.
Solving for Csc one obtains
Csc =
β(S+ O)
1− α0
(
α0p1, 1
2
− p0,0
)
+
(1− β)Oqb
1− α0
(
p1, 1
2
2
− p0,0
)
.(15)
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Partially differentiating w.r.t. O we obtain
∂Csc
∂O
=
β
1− α0
(
α0p1, 1
2
− p0,0
)
+
(1− β)qb
1− α0
(
p1, 1
2
2
− p0,0
)
.(16)
Both terms in brackets are positive by Assumption 4 as long as qb < 1. Using that
S+ O = (1 + r)S, partial differentiation w.r.t. β yields
∂Csc
∂β
=
S(1 + r)
1− α0
(
α0p1, 1
2
− p0,0
)
− rSqb
1− α0
(
p1, 1
2
2
− p0,0
)
(17)
=
S
1− α0
(
((1 + r)α0 − r(1− α0))(p1, 1
2
− 2p0,0) + p0,0(2α0 − 1)
)
.(18)
As α0 > 1− α0, all terms are positive.
Exacerbated underpricing occurs for costs in the region (Csc, Cˆsc). We now show that
Cˆsc increases in β and O and that it increases more than Csc. This requires the same
steps as above:
Cˆsc =
β(S+ O)
1− α0 (α0p1,1 − p0,0) +
(1− β)Oqb
1− α0
(p1,1
2
− p0,0
)
,(19)
∂Cˆsc
∂O
=
β
1− α0 (α0p1,1 − p0,0) +
(1− β)qb
1− α0
(p1,1
2
− p0,0
)
> 0,(20)
∂Cˆsc
∂β
=
S
1− α0 (((1 + r)α0 − r(1− α0))(p1,1 − 2p0,0) + p0,0(2α0 − 1)) > 0.(21)
Obviously, p1,1 > p1, 1
2
, so that the respective derivatives are all larger for Cˆsc than those
for Csc. 
C Appendix: Threshold Prices and their Closed Forms
Threshold prices. Denote by psi,µ the maximum price at which an investor with signal
si and price information µ buys, given all investors with s˜i ≥ si buy. At this price the
investor’s expected return from buying the security is zero, normalizing outside investment
opportunities accordingly.
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Define ψ(1|1, 1) := Pr(V = 1|si = 1, µ = 1) and ψ(0|1, 1) := Pr(V = 0|si = 1, µ = 1).
Consider now the structure of the conditional distribution f(d− 1|V ). For V = 1, this is
a binomial distribution over {0, . . . , N − 1} with center (N − 1)qi, and likewise for V = 0
with center (N − 1)(1 − qi). Since by Assumption 2, N is “large enough” for every qi,
f(d − 1|1) = 0 for d < N/2 and f(d − 1|0) = 0 for d ≥ N/2. When combining both
f(d − 1|1) and f(d − 1|0), we obtain a bi-modal function. In g(d − 1|si, µ), investors’
posterior distribution over demands, these are weighted with ψ(1|si, µ) and ψ(0|si, µ).
Assumption 2 now satisfies two purposes. The first is to ensure that we pick N large
enough, so that the two humps do not overlap. The second can be seen from the following
insight.
Claim For qi >
1
2
and any δ > 0 there exists a number of investors N(qi), such that
∑
pm(d)f(d− 1|0) < δ, and
∑
pm(d)f(d− 1|1) > 1− δ.
The claim states that market prices are mostly 0 or 1, if they are not, then the weight of
this demand is negligible. To see this consider the following heuristic argument. Figure 5
provides and intuitive illustration how the increase in N yields the result.
Figure 5 here.
Proof: pm(d) as given by equation (14) is an S-shaped function in d that is 0 below
N/2 and 1 above for almost all d when N is large. We focus on the lower tail, when
d < N/2; the case for d ≥ N/2 follows analogously. For fixed ǫ, define d∗ as the threshold
value that solves pm(d) = ǫ and increases linearly in N (it is at constant distance from
N/2). Density g(d− 1|si, µ) peaks at (N − 1)(1− qi) and (N − 1)qi. For large N , the two
binomial distributions in g are normal by DeMoivre-Laplace, and because the standard-
deviation is increasing in N only by
√
N , the distributions become more concentrated
around their means. Let d∗∗ denote the demand so that the weight under f(d − 1|0) for
values above d∗∗ is smaller than ǫ,
∑N
d=d∗∗ f(d − 1|0) = ǫ. Then d∗∗ increases in N at
rate ≈ √N , i.e. less than linear. This implies that there is a value N∗ so that d∗ > d∗∗.
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Consequently,
∑
pm(d)f(d−1|0) < (1− ǫ) · ǫ+ ǫ ·1 =: δ and can thus be made arbitrarily
small. 
A simple application of this claim is that
N∑
d=N/2
pm(d)
S
d
g(d−1|1, 1) ≈ 1 ·
N∑
d=N/2
S
d
g(d−1|1, 1), and
N/2−1∑
d=S
pm(d)
S
d
g(d−1|1, 1) ≈ 0.
Using the claim we can determine the threshold prices as follows. Consider first p1,1.
0 = (1− p1,1)
N∑
d=N/2
S
d
g(d− 1|1, 1)− p1,1
N/2−1∑
d=S
S
d
g(d− 1|1, 1)
⇔ p1,1 =
∑N
d=N/2
S
d
g(d− 1|1, 1)∑N
d=S
S
d
g(d− 1|1, 1) .(22)
For d ≥ N/2, g(d − 1|si, µ) = ψ(1|si, µ)f(d − 1|1) and for d < N/2, g(d − 1|si, µ) =
ψ(0|si, µ)f(d− 1|0). Also define
Σ0 :=
N/2−1∑
d=S
f(d− 1|0)/d and likewise Σ1 :=
N∑
d=N/2
f(d− 1|1)/d, and σ := Σ0/Σ1.
Also write ℓ(µ) := ψ(0|1, µ)/ψ(1|1, µ). Thus for the combination of signal si and price-
information µ with B1 we can write
(23) p1,1 = (1 + σℓ(1))
−1 and likewise p1, 1
2
= (1 + σℓ(1
2
))−1.
Consider now the case for p0,0. At this price all agents receive the security with equal
probability and we sum from 1 to N . Thus
0 = (1− p0,0)
N∑
d=N/2
S
N
g(d− 1|0, 0)− p0,0
N/2−1∑
d=1
S
N
g(d− 1|0, 0)⇔ p0,0 = ψ(1|0, 0).(24)
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Likewise we have
(25) p0, 1
2
= ψ(1|0, 1
2
).
Closed Forms of Threshold Prices. We will now derive approximate closed form
solutions so that we can solve our model analytically. In this appendix we let d denotes
the number of other investors with favourable information — this contrasts the previous
exposition but simplifies the notation here. First consider the strategy of agent number
N . There are N − 1 other investors. Given that he invests and the true value is, say,
V = 1, then by the law of large numbers, demand/the number of favorable signals will
always be larger than N/2. Furthermore, the market price is almost surely pm(d) = 1. If
d others order, then when buying he gets the asset with probability 1/(d + 1). Thus his
payoff for price p is
(1− p)
N−1∑
d=S−1
1
d+ 1
(
N − 1
d
)
qi
d(1− qi)N−1−d = (1− p)
N−1∑
d=N/2
1
d+ 1
(
N − 1
d
)
qi
d(1− qi)N−1−d.
To compute the sum we proceed in a similar manner as one would to compute the ex-
pected value of a binomial distribution: First observe that for large N the following holds
(approximately)
N−1∑
d=N/2
1
d+ 1
(
N − 1
d
)
qi
d(1− qi)N−1−d =
N−1∑
d=0
1
d+ 1
(
N − 1
d
)
qi
d(1− qi)N−1−d
Then we can compute
N−1∑
d=0
1
d+ 1
(
N − 1
d
)
qi
d(1− qi)N−1−d = 1
qiN
N−1∑
d=0
N !
(N − (d+ 1))!(d+ 1)! qi
d+1(1− qi)N−1−d
=
1
qiN
(
N∑
l=0
(
N
l
)
qi
l(1− qi)N−l −
(
N
0
)
qi
0(1− qi)N−0
)
=
1
qiN
(1− (1− qi)N ).
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In the second step we made a change of variable, l = d+ 1, but through this change, we
had to subtract the element of the sum for l = 0. Consequently, for large N , we can say
that
N−1∑
d=N/2
1
d+ 1
(
N − 1
d
)
qi
d(1− qi)N−1−d ≈ 1
qiN
and(26)
N−1∑
d=0
1
d+ 1
(
N − 1
d
)
qi
N−1−d(1− qi)d ≈ 1
(1− qi)N .(27)
Recall that we can write p1,1 as
p1,1 =
1
1 + ℓ(1) Σ0
Σ1
.(28)
What we now need to find is a closed form for
Σ0 =
N/2∑
d=S−1
1
d+ 1
(
N − 1
d
)
qi
N−1−d(1− qi)d.(29)
For increasing N one can see that 1
d+1
(
N−1
d
)
qi
N−1−d(1 − qi)d gets numerically symmetric
around (1− qi)N − 1. Thus we can express
Σ0 =
1
2
N/2∑
d=0
1
d+ 1
(
N − 1
d
)
qi
N−1−d(1− qi)d = 1
2
N∑
d=0
1
d+ 1
(
N − 1
d
)
qi
N−1−d(1− qi)d
≈ 1
2
1
(1− qi)N .(30)
Combining terms, we obtain
p1,1 =
1
1 + ℓ(1) Σ0
Σ1
≈ 1
1 + (1−qi)(1−qb)
qiqb
qiN)
2(1−q)N)
=
2qb
1 + qb
≡ qb
α1
.(31)
Similarly, we get
p1, 1
2
≈ 1
1 + 1−qi
qi
qiN
2(1−qi)N
=
2
3
, and p0,1 ≈ 1− qb
α0
.(32)
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The information content of a high pooling price is 1/2, and knowing this information,
the probability of the offering being successful is 3/4. Thus the interpretation of risky
prices is the ratio of the expected liquidation value given price-information to the share
of successful offerings given this information
p1,µ =
E[V |µ]
Pr(IPO successful | µ) .(33)
D Appendix: Maximal Reputation Costs
If an IPO fails, the worst that can happen is that the investment bank loses all future
IPO business, i.e. it is out of the market. Assuming that future business takes place in the
same environment (e.g. the quality of signals remains constant), the bank can maximally
lose all discounted future profits. Assume that the bank discounts future profits at rate
δ. Consider the case of highest potential costs C¯ that can occur from a failing IPO in a
separating equilibrium. An upper bound for costs is given by the discounted lost future
profits if p¯ = p1,1. Then ex-ante profits of a single IPO are
(34) Π(p0,0, p1,1, C) =
1
2
(S+ O)β (p0,0 +
1 + qb
2
p1,1)− 1− qb
4
C.
Assuming that an investment bank would conduct one IPO each period and accounting
for the fact that in a separating equilibrium the ex-ante probability of the IPO to be
successful is (3 + qb)/4 we get
(35) Cmax =
∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)t · ((3 + qb)/4)t · Π(p0,0, p1,1, Cmax).
Solving for maximal possible costs we obtain
(36) Cmax = 2(S+ O)β
p0,0 +
1+qb
2
p1,1
δ(3 + qb) + 2(1− qb) .
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Comparing values of Cmax to those of C¯ shows that for qi and qb sufficiently large
C¯ ≫ Cmax. Furthermore, for reasonable values of the discount rate, the reverse rela-
tion holds true only for values of qi and qb where we get C¯
sc < C¯. That is, either C¯sc < C¯
and informational inefficiencies result, or C¯ is so large that it lies outside the relevant
parameter region in the context of this model.
E Appendix: Payoff Comparison
To compare payoffs, we compute these both when short-covering is allowed and when it is
not. In the computations we employ the closed form price and probability approximations
derived above. When computing payoffs numerically, we use the empirically observed
numbers β = 7% and O = 15%S.
Payoffs for High- and Low-Signal Bank Combined. First observe that if costs are
lower than C or if costs are higher than Cˆsc, then banks always win. The reason is that in
both cases the prices and thus expected revenues remain constant. In addition the bank
also earn short covering profits.
We consider two special cases.
First, suppose that costs are exactly Cˆ. We then know that without short covering
the high price is p1,1. Let us focus on the case where at this cost with short covering,
banks pool in price p1, 1
2
. We know that Cˆ is defined so that
(37) Π(p0,0|sb = 0, B0,1) = Π(p1,1|sb = 0, B1).
We can therefore express these profits as
(38)
Π(p0,0|sb = 0, B0,1) +Π(p1,1|sb = 1, B1) = (α1+α0)βS(1+ r)p1,1− ((1−α1) + (1−α0))C.
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With short coverings, profits are
Π(p1, 1
2
|sb = 0, B1) + Π(p1, 1
2
|sb = 1, B1) + Πsc(p1, 1
2
|sb = 0, B1) + Πsc(p1, 1
2
|sb = 1, B1)
= (α1 + α0)βS(1 + r)p1, 1
2
− ((1− α1) + (1− α0))C + ((1− α1) + (1− α0))(1− β)p1, 1
2
rS.
Substituting for the closed form approximations of prices and probabilities, and then
taking the difference of payoffs with and without short covering this simplifies to
(39) S
(
β(1 + r)
(
1− 3qb
1 + qb
)
+
1
3
(1− β)r
)
.
This is positive as long as r is sufficiently larger than β and holds, for instance, for the
empirically observed values r = 15%, β = 7%. For this reason the red line is always above
the blue line at Cˆ in the right panel of Figure 4.
The second scenario that we study is when costs are Csc. In this case, φsc0 (p0,0) = p1, 1
2
.
The most extreme drop in revenue happens when Cˆ < Csc, so that without short covering
at the costs that we consider, the bank plays a separation equilibrium with high price
p1,1. Note that for such a cost C
sc > Cˆ, without short covering the low-signal bank is not
indifferent between a risky and a riskless price as φ0(p0,0) > p1,1 and thus strictly prefers
the low separation price. With short covering, by the definition of Csc, the low-signal
bank is indifferent between the risky price p1, 1
2
and the risk-free low separation price p0,0.
So the difference to the above computations are the payoffs for the low-signal type,
Π1(p0,0|sb = 0, B0,1) = p0,0βS(1 + r),(40)
Π1(p0,0|sb = 0, B0,1) + Π2(p0,0|sb = 0, B0,1) = p0,0βS(1 + r) + q(1− β)rSp0,0.(41)
Combining this with the high-signal bank’s payoff and taking differences, we find that if
(42) ((1− q)(1− β)r − (2q − 1)β(1 + r) + 3q(1− β)p0,0) S/3 < 0,
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then the bank loses on average. The North-East segment in the left panel of Figure 4
represents the parameter configurations qb and qi where this occurs.
With respect to signal qualities, this area appears to be significant. But note that
this is the most extreme case in all dimensions: this scenario arises only for the special
case that also Csc > Cˆ and it only arise in a strict subinterval of [Cˆ, Cˆsc]. Moreover, even
in the special case the bank is on average better off for all other costs. The right panel
of Figure 4 illustrates this point. To summarize, the bank is almost always better off on
average.
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-t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
The bank and the
investors each
receive a signal
about the issuing
firm.
The bank sets the
offer price. Investors
decide whether or
not to buy.
Shares (plus short
position) are floated
or the offer is
withdrawn.
Aftermarket trading
begins. The short position
is covered in the market or
through the overallotment
option.
Figure 1: The Timing of the Game.
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price
costsC Cˆ C
p∗ = p1, 1
2
p¯∗ = φ0(p0,0)
p∗ = p0,0
p¯∗ = p1,1
p∗ = p0, 1
2
Figure 2: Threshold Costs and Equilibrium Prices. For low costs, C ≤ C, if the
high-signal bank would want to uphold separation it would have to set a price below the
risky pooling price p1, 1
2
; since this is too expensive, pooling in price p1, 1
2
prevails. For a
medium range of costs, C ∈ (C, C¯), there will be a separating equilibrium. For the high
end of this range, C ∈ [Cˆ, C¯), the high-signal bank can charge the highest separating price
p¯∗ = p1,1. For the lower end, C ∈ (C, Cˆ), however, the high-signal bank cannot charge the
highest separation price. Instead, to prevent the low-signal bank from mimicking it must
set a lower price φ0(p0,0) ∈ (p1, 1
2
, p1,1). Finally, for very large withdrawal costs, C ≥ C¯,
separation is too risky for the high-signal bank so that pooling in a risk-free price p0, 1
2
results.
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Investor Bank Issuer
Cash
Shares
S shares S shares
pS (1− β)pS
Investor Bank Issuer
S+ O shares S+ O shares
p(S+ O) (1− β)p(S+ O)
Investor Bank Issuer
S+ O shares
at IPO
O shares
in market
S shares
p(S+ O)
pm ·O
(1− β)pS
Flows without short covering.
Flows with option exercise
when pm ≥ p.
Flows with short covering
when pm < p.
Figure 3: Flows of Shares and Cash. The figure illustrates the flows of shares and cash
between issuer, bank, and investors. The left panel describes transfers if short-covering
is not allowed, the middle panel shows the transfers when short covering is allowed, but
does not take place because the bank exercises its option. The right panel documents
that when short covering does take place (the market price pm drops below the offer price
p), there are additional transfers: O shares are sold short to investors at the offer price p
and are bought back at the market price pm.
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and bank payoffs
Payoff functions with
and without short covering
Figure 4: Informational Efficiency and the Sign of the Bank’s Net Profit.
Left Panel: For parameters in the the large blue area, banks are better off on average.
In the North-East area, the bank may lose. However, the graph is drawn for the scenario
in which payoffs with short covering are lowest and it is compared to a scenario when
payoffs without short covering are highest. The circled area in the right panel indicates a
situation where payoffs decline, and it also illustrates why the set of such parameters is
potentially quite small. The bottom left area is excluded by Assumption 4. The Figure
is drawn for the standard empirical parameters β = 7%, O = S× 15%.
Right Panel: The figure draws profits of the bank as a function of withdrawal costs
C; the lower, blue line is for the case without short-covering, the higher, red lines are for
the case with short covering. Profits with short covering are lowest at Csc, and the most
extreme scenario of price drops relative to the situation without short-covering combined
with lowest short-covering profits occur when Cˆ < Csc. The figure is drawn for this case.
For the higher, dashed line of the two, the bank gains for every value C; in the left panel,
this corresponds to the blue area. For the lower, solid red line, there is a range of costs
so that the bank loses. This corresponds to the North-East area in the left panel. As can
be seen, even if parameters are such that Cˆ < Csc, then the bank loses only for a small
subset of costs. Moreover, a scenario where Cˆ < Csc holds only for a subset of parameters
(which is, however, not visible from these graphs). Appendix E describes in detail how
these graphs are derived.
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Figure 5: The market price and the distribution of favorable signals in de-
pendence of the number of investors. The figure illustrates how the shape of the
aftermarket price function and the distribution of favorable signals change in the number
of investors. All three graphs are plotted for qi = qb = .75. The conditional probability
distribution over d−1 others’ favorable signals as described in Appendix C is plotted from
the perspective of an investor who has favorable information. The market price pm(d) is
as in equation (14), but has been re-scaled to simplify the visualization; it is the dashed
line. The left panel plots the probability of d− 1 favorable signals and the market price
for N = 10. The conditional signal distributions f(d− 1|0) and f(d− 1|1) are clearly not
symmetric around their modes. For N = 50, as in the middle panel, the two distributions
f(d− 1|0) and f(d− 1|1) are already almost symmetric around their modes and also the
“overlap” with values in pm(d) that are not 0 or 1 is small. In the right panel, N = 100
and this overlap is almost non-existent.
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